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Abstract 26 
International institutions, understood as sets of rules contained in international agreements, 27 
are aimed at orienting national governments towards specific policy options. Nevertheless, 28 
they can determine a change in national policies and practices only if states are willing and 29 
capable of incorporating international obligations into their national legislations and 30 
ensuring their application and enforcement in areas that follow completely under national 31 
jurisdiction. The establishment of marine protected areas promoted by international 32 
agreements as a tool for the protection of marine resources represents an interesting case 33 
for revealing the complex interactions between international institutions and national 34 
actors. Particularly, the establishment of these areas in Senegal shows the salience of 35 
domestic constellations of actors who may support or undercut national commitments to 36 
international regimes: political elites, bureaucracies, the general public and target groups. 37 
By anchoring the empirical analysis to an actor-centred institutionalist perspective, the 38 
article explains how dynamic constellations of actors can distort the penetration of 39 
international objectives in the national policy framework. Different constellations of 40 
national actors can indeed bend international institutions at different moments: during the 41 
formulation of a new law in line with international obligations; in the definition of its 42 
implementation framework; and in the enforcement of national policies. 43 
 44 
KEY WORDS – Marine protected areas, Senegal, implementation, international 45 
institutions, public policies, actor constellation. 46 
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“International decisions are normally binding only for states. In turn, states are 51 
typically expected to put into place at the national level programs or legislations that 52 
transmit international commitments into action domestically. National administration, 53 
review, enforcement, and sometimes litigation lead to actual changes in the behaviour 54 
of polluters, fishers, farmers, and other targets” (Victor and others 1998: 4-5). 55 
 56 
 57 
1. Introduction 58 
Global commons are commonly defined as those portions of the planet that are localized 59 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. They are areas such as the high seas, Antarctica, 60 
the atmosphere and outer space, not susceptible to national appropriation; the natural 61 
resources found in these spaces are intended for the benefit of all mankind (Buck 1998: 5-62 
6; Joyner 1998: 25-27; Vogler 2000: 1-6). This original concept of global commons has 63 
recently been expanded and the biodiversity of the entire planet has started to be 64 
interpreted as an ‘emerging global common’ (Flitner 1998: 144) “whose misuse negatively 65 
affects not just local or regional populations, but us all” (Goldman 1998: 35). The 66 
commons aspect of the world biomass does not lie in its location or appropriation, but on 67 
the ‘globally common effect’ that its destruction may cause (Joyner 1998: 20). By 68 
adaptation of this argument to fisheries, the mismanagement of fisheries resources located 69 
in the area under national jurisdiction, i.e. the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), has 70 
consequences for biodiversity that do not stop at the EEZ. This makes areas of national 71 
jurisdiction such as the EEZ the object of a global responsibility (Treves 13.10.2008). 72 
The solution to the tragedy of global commons cannot be represented by the state, 73 
but rather by international institutions (Flitner 1998: 144; Joyner 1998: 26-29; Goldman 74 
1998b: 36-39). Understood as sets of formal rules contained in international agreements, 75 
international institutions aim at orienting national governments towards specific policy 76 
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options and determining a change in national policies and practices (Keohane and others 77 
1993; Stokke and others 1999). A complex institutional framework for fisheries 78 
management has been developed at the global level by the United Nations and its agencies 79 
through binding and non-binding agreements (Turrell 2004). In this framework, marine 80 
protected areas (MPAs) have been recognized as a useful tool for the conservation of the 81 
marine environment and its living resources (Gubbay 1995; Pomeroy and others 2005; 82 
World Bank 2006). The 4th World Wilderness Congress (1987) has extensively defined 83 
MPAs as “Any area of intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with its overlying water and 84 
associated flora, fauna, historical and cultural features, which has been reserved by law or 85 
other effective means to protect part or all of the enclosed environment” (Gubbay 2004: 2). 86 
The definition covers areas that are known by different names (e.g., marine nature reserves 87 
and marine parks) and established for different purposes (protection of marine living 88 
resources, protection of historic resources, etc.) (Charles 2001: 233; Gubbay 2004: 2-11; 89 
Gubbay 1995: 3; Pomeroy and others 2005: 486). This articles focuses on MPAs 90 
established to aid in the recovery of overexploited fish stocks. 91 
Generally understood as ‘areas of the marine environment designated for some 92 
form of protection’ (Charles 2001: 233), marine protected areas (MPAs) have been 93 
internationally promoted as a tool for the protection of biodiversity and fisheries 94 
management since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 95 
(UNCED). UNCED took place in 1992 and produced Agenda 21 and the Convention on 96 
Biological Diversity (CBD) (Breide and Saunders 2005; Gibson and Warren 1995; Lagoni 97 
2003). The objectives of the UNCED, in general, and the commitment by national states to 98 
establish protected areas on the marine environment, in particular, have been more recently 99 
confirmed by the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI) adopted at the 2002 World 100 
Summit on Sustainable Development (Cicin-Sain and Belfiore 2005; Freestone and others 101 
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2006). However, international institutions can only be effective if states are willing and 102 
capable of incorporating international obligations into their national legislations and 103 
ensuring their application and enforcement in areas that follow completely under national 104 
jurisdiction (Cicin-Sain and others 2006). This implies a complex interaction between 105 
international institutions, on the one hand, and states (with their domestic actors), on the 106 
other. 107 
The establishment and implementation of MPAs in Senegal represents an 108 
interesting case for understanding such interaction and untangling the interplay between 109 
international institutions and national actors. A better understanding of the knots tangling 110 
institutions and actors has been pursued through the adoption of an actor-centred 111 
institutionalist approach. Actor-centred institutionalism (ACI) constitutes, indeed, our 112 
theoretical anchorage and is explained in the following section. 113 
 114 
 115 
2. International institutions and national actors 116 
The theoretical framework proposed by Scharpf (1997) analyzes the interactions between 117 
institutions and actors. The latter are understood by Sharpf (1997) as ‘collective and 118 
corporate actors’ rather than ‘individuals acting on their own account’. Hence, they include 119 
“political parties, labor unions, government ministries, central banks, or international 120 
organizations” (Scharpf 1997: 39). Scharpf (1997) acknowledges that institutions (or 121 
formal rules) influence actors and their interactions, but not in a ‘deterministic sense’. In 122 
the context of a specific institutional setting and on the basis of personal beliefs and 123 
interests, actors may, indeed, “evade or […] violate the norms and rules that they are 124 
supposed to follow” (Scharpf 1997: 21). The result is that a given policy problem defines a 125 
specific ‘actor constellation’ (i.e. the plurality of actors involved in the problem at stake), 126 
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which can bend institutions and ultimately determine the final outcome of specific rules 127 
(Scharpf 1997). 128 
Even in the presence of ‘negotiated agreements’, such as international institutions 129 
(or rules), the final outcome is then determined not by the agreement, or institutions (which 130 
rather function as a remote cause), but by the “subsequent interactions of parties committed 131 
to observe its rules” (taken as the proximate variables) (Scharpf 1997: 25). Put differently, 132 
according to Scharpf (1997), whenever a normative framework, or regime, is reached 133 
consensually, each single actor is free to respect the obligations contained in the agreed 134 
framework. It follows that the capacity to solve a specific policy issue rather lies in the 135 
actor constellation than in the institutional context in which actors’ interactions take place. 136 
In the case of international agreements, the parties (or actors) who interact and 137 
ultimately determine the final outcome of international rules are not simply the nation-138 
states. Complex domestic constellations of multiple actors may undercut national 139 
commitments to international agreements: political elites (at national, regional and local 140 
level), bureaucracies and implementing agencies, economic interests and business, target 141 
groups and the civil society (Scharpf 1997). Furthermore, according to Andresen and 142 
others (1995), the implementation of international instruments needs to be understood as a 143 
process that includes three phases: 144 
1. from the international provision to the enacting national law (i.e. enactment); 145 
2. from this law to its executing acts (or administrative rules) (i.e. execution); 146 
3. and from such rules to the induced behavioural change through the application 147 
of those acts (i.e. enforcement). 148 
This suggests that constellations of different actors at the domestic level (i.e. political, 149 
bureaucratic, general public and targeted actors), can facilitate or distort the penetration of 150 
international objectives in the national policy framework in three different moments: in the 151 
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formulation of a new law, in the definition of its implementation framework, and in the 152 
enforcement of the national policy (see figure 1). 153 
 154 
[Insert Figure 1 here: ‘International institutions and national actors’] 155 
 156 
After providing some information on the methodology and the data collected, the 157 
paper contextualizes marine protected areas within Senegal’s fisheries and traces their 158 
establishment in the framework of international institutions. This is done with the aim of 159 
exploring actors’ constellations and interactions in a process of reform in national policies 160 
and administrative settings. 161 
 162 
 163 
3. Data collection 164 
The study of the establishment and implementation of marine protected areas (MPAs) in 165 
Senegal has relied on process-tracing as the research method. Used in within-case analyses, 166 
the method of process-tracing incorporates historical narratives of specific events within 167 
general theoretical frameworks elaborated in social sciences (George and Bennett 2005: 168 
205). Events and chronologies are crucial building, but the final purpose is to create a ‘case 169 
study’ with a strong analytical component, not a mere ‘case history’ (Pettigrew 1997: 339). 170 
Therefore, the causal mechanism (or process) at work in a specific situation is not simply 171 
traced, but mapped in a ‘theoretically informed way’ (Checkel 2005: 5-6; George and 172 
Bennett 2005: 207). This positions our study in the domain of qualitative research. In 173 
qualitative research, data are ‘usually in the form of words rather than numbers’ and aim at 174 
providing a holistic vision on the phenomenon studied (Miles and Huberman 1994: 1-6). 175 
Particularly in process tracing, data are ‘overwhelmingly qualitative in nature’ (Checkel 176 
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2005: 6): “In process-tracing, the researcher examines histories” (George and Bennett 177 
2005: 6). 178 
In order to reconstruct the process that led to the establishment of MPAs in Senegal 179 
and the main obstacles in their national implementation, Anglophone and Francophone 180 
literature from different fields has been used, together with policy documents of the last 181 
twenty years. Nevertheless, the most relevant information came from field research carried 182 
out in Dakar in March 2009. Interviewees have included civil servants of the Ministry of 183 
Maritime Economy, members of national and local consultative bodies, and representatives 184 
of professional organizations and NGOs. Although the answers may suffer from the 185 
subjectivity bias of respondents, the number of actors interviewed (i.e. 10 interviewees) in 186 
several positions and roles has allowed us to cross-check and verify the validity of the 187 
information obtained. Particularly, in order to verify the reliability of the data received 188 
from Senegalese civil servants, these data have been compared with those provided by 189 
interviewees from the civil society (i.e. representatives of professional organizations and 190 
NGOs). Informal conversations with experts working on fisheries in West Africa 191 
(researchers and practitioners) have completed the information collected during formal 192 
interviews. Through these triangulations, useful data have been collected on the process of 193 
establishment and implementation of marine protected areas in Senegal. 194 
 195 
 196 
4. The relevance of fisheries for Senegal society and economy 197 
Since its independence from France (1960), Senegal has developed a policy framework for 198 
fisheries based on a hard utilization of fisheries resources for national development. The 199 
country has built artisanal and industrial fleets and a transformation industry, which has 200 
made fisheries a vital resource for the whole country, as a source of export, employment 201 
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and food. With a current annual production of 400,000 tons, the fishing sector largely 202 
contributes to the GDP of the country (i.e. 1.4% of the total GDP in 2006). Since the 203 
1980s, fisheries have constituted a quarter of national export revenue and employed (both 204 
directly and indirectly) approximately 600.000 people (i.e. 17% of the whole population). 205 
Finally, fish products constitute an important source of food with about 70% of animal 206 
protein intake coming from fisheries (MME 2007; MME 2008; Pramod and Pitcher, 2006). 207 
Senegal’s hard utilization of fisheries resources has resulted in a severe exploitation 208 
of fish stocks, whose effects started to be visible in the last twenty years and are now more 209 
pronounced. The recent loss in catches (up to about 30% for some species) has caused an 210 
enormous decrease in the contribution of the fishing sector to the national GDP, export of 211 
fisheries products, and employment. In this framework, Senegal has recently adopted 212 
national strategy documents that acknowledge the key role of fisheries for poverty 213 
reduction and economic growth (e.g., Documents de stratégie de réduction de la pauvreté 214 
and Stratégie nationale de Croissance Accélerée) and emphasize the need to promote a 215 
sustainable use of fisheries resources (MME 2007; MME 2008). Nevertheless, this 216 
recognition and formal political commitment have not been followed by successful actions; 217 
marine protected areas represent an interesting case. 218 
 219 
 220 
5. Marine protected areas in Senegal 221 
 222 
5.1. Enactment and the introduction of marine protected areas in Senegal 223 
In Senegal, areas of the marine environment have been designated for some form of 224 
protection since the 1970s in the framework of nature reserves and national parks which 225 
embraced both terrestrial and marine areas (e.g., Parc National du Delta du Saloum). 226 
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However, in those marine areas under special protection, fishing activities (mainly 227 
artisanal) were often still allowed. The protection of the marine environment (also from 228 
artisanal fishers) was given renewed emphasis by the Presidential Decree of 2004. The 229 
Decree No. 2004-1408 establishes five new ‘marine protected areas’ (Camara 2008): 230 
1. Abene, 231 
2. Bambouk, 232 
3. Joal Fadiouth, 233 
4. Kayar, 234 
5. and Saint Louis. 235 
Although the concept of marine protection had already found some expression within the 236 
abovementioned nature reserves and national parks, the term and explicit 237 
acknowledgement of ‘marine protected areas’ to prevent fish stocks depletion was 238 
introduced for the very first time in the Senegalese primary legislation by this Presidential 239 
Decree of 2004. Marine protected areas are not envisaged neither by the Code of Marine 240 
Fisheries (CMF) issued in 1998, nor by the Code of Environment (CoE) of 2001 (MME 241 
2008; confirmed during interviews with civil servants, Dakar, March 2009). 242 
The designation of the five areas has been presented during our field work as the 243 
direct result of the President’s commitment to the provisions of the Johannesburg Plan of 244 
Implementation (JPoI), signed by the country in 2002 (Interviews with civil servants and 245 
practitioners, Dakar, March 2009). In the Senegalese parliamentary system, the President 246 
constitutes the main authority: he not only gives policy guidance and directions, but 247 
strongly intervenes in the legislative and administrative action, through laws and decrees 248 
(Chazan and others 1999; Rondinelli and Minis 1990). 249 
The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPoI) seems, then, to have placed the 250 
establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs) among the priorities of the national 251 
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political agenda in Senegal (Interviews with civil servants, Dakar, March 2009). However, 252 
the international pressure represented by the agreement signed at Johannesburg cannot, on 253 
its own, explain the establishment of MPAs in Senegal. Indeed, MPAs had already been 254 
foreseen at the international level by Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological 255 
Diversity (CBD) in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, Agenda 21 and the CBD were not 256 
particularly influential on Senegalese policy developments; MPAs started to be taken into 257 
serious account by the Senegalese government more than ten years later, under the new 258 
commitments of the JPoI. What was changed in the meanwhile (between the early 1990s 259 
and early 2000s) was the general situation of non opposition from target groups, mainly 260 
artisanal fishers. 261 
It is this absence of conflicts with fishers which has allowed the introduction of 262 
MPAs in Senegal’s policy framework through a presidential decree. Such consensual 263 
environment has a twofold explanation. Firstly, at the beginning of the years 2000, small 264 
fisheries actors could no longer deny the crisis of fish stock which had been undermining 265 
fisheries since the 1990s and which became more visible in recent years through a drop in 266 
fishers’ revenues. Secondly, target groups had been made sensitive to the need of 267 
protecting fisheries resources by NGOs which spread in the country thanks to international 268 
financial support (Interviews with civil servants, artisanal fisheries organizations, and 269 
NGOs, Dakar, March 2009). 270 
 In conclusion, the enactment phase has revealed three interesting points. 271 
1.  The coupling between a political commitment at the highest level of the Senegalese 272 
political system and the general acceptance on the side of target groups has opened 273 
up the Senegalese domestic policy framework to the influence of international 274 
institutions (or rules). 275 
2.  Target groups’ (i.e. fishers) acceptance for policy change seems to have been 276 
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motivated by a diffused perception of crisis of the fish stocks and the fisheries 277 
sector. 278 
3.  NGOs have played a role during this face by enhancing problem awareness among 279 
target groups. 280 
 281 
5.2. Execution and definition of the administrative framework 282 
According to the presidential decree that establishes five marine protected areas (MPAs) in 283 
Senegal (Decree 2004-1408), the five MPAs had to be jointly managed by the ministry in 284 
charge of fisheries and the one in charge of environment. The decree de facto recognizes 285 
both ministries as responsible for specifying and supervising the functioning of MPAs; 286 
they had to define a managing authority and a plan for each MPA (Decree 2004-1408). In 287 
practice, however, since their creation and until 2008, MPAs have been the direct 288 
competence of the Ministry of Environment, under the Directorate for National Parks 289 
(Direction des Parcs Nationaux) (Camara 2008). International funding, which has been 290 
channelled through NGOs (e.g., IUCN and WWF), has supported the Directorate with 291 
financial resources, equipment and personnel. 292 
In 2008, a ministerial reorganization has shifted the competences for the 293 
management of MPAs from the Ministry of Environment (MoE) to the Ministry of 294 
Maritime Economy (MME) (although the related Decree has not yet been published at the 295 
time of writing). It has been decided that the Directorate for Marine Fisheries (Direction 296 
des Pêches Maritimes) (under the MME) will be fully in charge of coordinating the 297 
management of Senegal’s MPAs. It may also be possible that a new Directorate (i.e. 298 
Direction des Aires Marines Protégée) will be created within the Ministry of Maritime 299 
Economy (MME) (Interviews with civil servants, Dakar, March 2009). The final 300 
‘machinery’ for the administration of MPAs is still unclear and represents the object of 301 
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political pressures and personal stakes, rather than the result of a clear strategy and the 302 
pursuit of efficiency. 303 
In Senegal, competences at ministerial level are periodically reshuffled, moved 304 
away, and moved back among ministries. The continuous change (and exchange) takes the 305 
form of a valse des compétences (‘waltz of competences’ - from an interview with a civil 306 
servant, Dakar, March 2009). Even when the machinery for implementation is clarified by 307 
the law, a continuous production of presidential decrees can easily change responsibilities. 308 
The point is that each minister wants to have more competences, hence more power and 309 
prestige, but – most of all – more job positions. They allow employing more people, hence, 310 
maintaining personal clienteles and gaining more (political) support for future elections. 311 
The result is that each minister tries to influence the President’s view on what branches of 312 
the public administration should be enhanced and broadened. This is often done by 313 
exploiting issues recurrent in public debates, either internally or at the international level, 314 
as in the case of marine protected areas (Interviews with a civil servant, Dakar, March 315 
2009; confirmation to these statements have been given by academic researchers in 316 
Senegal). 317 
In conclusion, two relevant aspects emerge from the execution process. 318 
1. The state bureaucracy, absent during the previous phase (enactment), plays a key 319 
role during this stage; in other words, it is during the definition of the 320 
implementation framework that administrative agencies, moved by different 321 
interests, become the protagonist. 322 
2. This bureaucratic politics can represent a severe obstacle to any initiative of reform 323 
(in existing policies and administrative arrangements), unless a strong political 324 
leadership commits to specific actions in the framework of a clear policy strategy. 325 
 326 
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5.3. Enforcement and management 327 
While fisheries policy is still an exclusive competence of the central administration 328 
(Camara 2008), the management of environmental resources has been delegated to local 329 
governments (compétences déléguées) since the 1996 (Rondinelli and Minis 1990), at least 330 
on paper. In this framework, marine protected areas (MPAs) are designed to be co-331 
managed by the central administration and local communities (i.e., local executives and 332 
societal stakeholders) through a ‘management committee’ (comité de gestion) which 333 
directly involves fisheries associations and NGOs. Coordination and supervision is 334 
nonetheless supposed to be ensured by the central administration through the ‘conservator’ 335 
(conservateur) appointed, for each MPA, by the Ministry of Environment (Interviews with 336 
civil servants and members of consultative bodies, Dakar, March 2009). 337 
It follows that the bureaucratic politics highlighted above, with the ‘slipping away’ 338 
of competences from the Ministry of Environment (MoE) towards the Ministry of 339 
Maritime Economy (MME) results in a high level of confusion and paralysis in the actual 340 
management of MPAs. In other words, the conflicts of competences (at the top) existing 341 
within the Senegalese’s public administration (between the MME and the MoE), which 342 
creates confusion already at the stage of execution and definition of the implementation 343 
framework (MME 2008), do not help solve the weaknesses present on the ground during 344 
the enforcement of these areas. 345 
As soon as, in 2008, it was rumoured that the competence for the MPAs would be 346 
shifted from the Directorate for National Parks (Ministry of Environment) to a new 347 
directorate for marine protected areas under the Ministry for Maritime Economy (MME), 348 
the conservators appointed by the Ministry of Environment (MoE) have been recalled by 349 
their competent Minister. This left a temporary vacuum in the management and police 350 
activity of MPAs, which caused an immediate collapse of the already low degree of 351 
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protection achieved in those areas. The urgency determined the direct involvement of the 352 
Presidency (supported by NGOs), which has resulted in the maintenance of the 353 
conservators by the MoE until the new Directorate for MPAs (under the MME) will be 354 
created (Interviews with civil servants and with an NGO representative, Dakar, March 355 
2009). 356 
This episode of mismanagement of the areas has weakened even further the scarce 357 
monitoring of MPAs (Pramod and Pitcher 2006). Scarce monitoring and weak sanctioning 358 
are not only due to the lack of adequate administrative resources (e.g., funds, personnel and 359 
equipment), but also – and more importantly – to a general administrative inaction by those 360 
street level bureaucrats in charge of surveillance. This tolerance has multiple explanations. 361 
At least three are worth being mentioned here: political concerns, cultural factors, and 362 
clientelism. Firstly, legislation in not strictly enforced because it might ignite broader 363 
social conflicts that could, in turn, generate political instability. Secondly, in a cultural 364 
context where the concept of ‘family’ refers to a wide network of relationships, it is 365 
difficult to sanction relatives who violate rules (Camara 2008). Thirdly, this tolerance 366 
towards ‘relatives’ results in a widespread clientelism that – together with diffuse 367 
corruption and physical threats to street-level bureaucrats – hinders enforcement of 368 
existing laws (Informal talks with researchers in Senegal). 369 
As a consequence of weak monitoring and sanctioning, small fishers have 370 
continued to fish with no respect for the marine protected areas (MPAs) established. 371 
Together with the perception of crisis by small fishers and their limited involvement in co-372 
management mechanisms, then, administrative tolerance during enforcement explains why 373 
opposition from artisanal fishers to the establishment of MPAs has not been very strong at 374 
the enactment phase (Interviews with a representative from an industrial fisheries 375 
association, Dakar, March 2009). In simple words, in the absence of a real monitoring and 376 
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sanctioning mechanism, marine areas are left to open access, and fishers can continue 377 
fishing with no restrictions, so that conflicts are avoided. The only MPA that works 378 
efficiently (i.e. Bambouk) has always been a fishing area with an extremely low fishing 379 
activity (Interviews with artisanal fisheries associations, Dakar, March 2009). 380 
In conclusion, during enforcement, the following elements need to be stressed. 381 
1.  Conflicts at the top of the administration weaken monitoring and sanctioning 382 
activities at the bottom during enforcement. 383 
2.  A climate of administrative inaction and tolerance for violations by street-level 384 
bureaucrats weakens even further enforcement activities. 385 
3. This tolerance is only partially explained by the scarcity of administrative 386 
resources. Considerations of political convenience, due to the political weight of 387 
fishers’ constituency, and cultural features are highly accountable for this 388 
administrative tolerance. 389 
 390 
 391 
6. Discussion of data 392 
 393 
6.1. International institutions define a pool of solutions to the problem of environmental 394 
degradation. A specific solution embodied in international institutions can penetrate the 395 
national agenda only in the presence of a favourable constellation of domestic actors. 396 
Marine protected areas as a policy tool for the protection of the marine environment and its 397 
fisheries resources have been foreseen by international institutions since the beginning of 398 
the 1990s. Nevertheless, the concept has entered Senegal’s primary legislation only after 399 
the overt commitment of its Presidency to the obligations of the Johannesburg Plan of 400 
Implementation. 401 
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This Presidency’s commitment was only made possible by the weak opposition of 402 
artisanal fishers (see below), i.e. the main target group in this initiative. Artisanal fishers in 403 
Senegal have, indeed, a high political weight: suffice it to know that there are around 404 
13.000 small-scale fishing vessels in Senegal, each employing several persons. It is evident 405 
that the constituency of small fishers is very broad and it can, therefore, exert high pressure 406 
on political decision and even block policy initiatives (Interview at a national industrial 407 
fisheries association, Dakar, March 2009). 408 
One of the explanations for this apparent low level of opposition from target 409 
groups, at least during the enactment phase, is the awareness of the depletion of fisheries 410 
resources enhanced by NGOs during the last few years. Particularly environmental NGOs 411 
have also channelled international funding for MPAs initiatives, which seem to have 412 
constituted an incentive for the presidential commitment to international obligations, 413 
together with the crisis perception and the search of international visibility. 414 
Therefore the presence of a favourable constellation of actors opened the gate for a 415 
revision of the national legislative framework in line with international provisions (i.e. 416 
institutions) promoting the creation of MPAs. 417 
 418 
6.2. Actor constellations are dynamic and change in their components (i.e. actors) and 419 
disposition along the process of implementation of international institutions, from 420 
enactment to execution and enforcement. Support to institutional changes seems to 421 
decrease across these phases, when the change becomes more visible. 422 
While the enactment phase has been mainly played at the highest political level and has 423 
relied on a situation of non-opposition from the side of target groups, the execution phase 424 
has taken place in the bureaucratic arena. Here, competition on competences have blocked 425 
the entire process and hindered the actual functioning of MPAs. Such bureaucratic politics 426 
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and conflicts among ministries have also compromised the enforcement of the areas, at 427 
least temporarily, until a direct intervention of the Presidency solved the vacuum left in the 428 
monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. 429 
Although enactment has been characterized by a partial consensus from fishers to 430 
the establishment of MPAs, their opposition increased once the initiative could determine a 431 
visible change in the form of exclusion of fishing activities from a specific area. 432 
Awareness building by NGOs and the inclusion of target groups in management activities 433 
as a solution to conflicts has been less effective than expected. Only one area works in 434 
practice, the one where fishing activity has always been less intense; here, the stakes are 435 
low. Furthermore, strong enforcement against violations seems difficult not only because 436 
of the absence of means, but – more importantly – for the political weight embodied by the 437 
artisanal fishers’ constituency which determines a diffuse administrative tolerance by those 438 
in charge of applying the law (i.e. street-level bureaucrats). 439 
 440 
6.3. The perception of crises and urgencies by domestic actors is likely to increase 441 
national support for international institutions. 442 
The key role of fisheries for poverty reduction and economic growth has been 443 
acknowledged by the political elite in recent documents (see footnote 1). Such 444 
acknowledgment of the relevance of the fisheries sector goes hand in hand with the 445 
recognition of the crisis in fish catch reported by policy makers (as a mere example see 446 
MME 2007 and MME 2008) and directly experienced by fishermen (as reported in 447 
interviews with civil servants, artisanal fisheries organizations and NGOs, Dakar, March 448 
2009). The exploitation of fish stock beyond any limit of sustainability has, indeed, 449 
produced effects which have become visible in the last twenty years and are now even 450 
more evident. 451 
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The evident crisis of fisheries resources has urged strong policy decisions on the 452 
part of the political elite, of which the establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs) is 453 
just an example. On the other hand, the depletion of fish stocks has become visible to small 454 
fishers, too, through a drop of revenues generated by their activity (Interviews with civil 455 
servants, Dakar, March 2009). This seems to have facilitated the enactment of new national 456 
initiatives for marine protection, such as the five MPAs (Decree No. 2004-1408). 457 
 458 
 459 
7. Conclusion 460 
The commitment to the establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs) promoted by 461 
international institutions has met the support of the Presidency in the early 2000s as a 462 
response to the depletion of fisheries resources and the consequent socio-economic 463 
implications for Senegal. The support of the Presidency, which has pushed for an 464 
introduction of MPAs in the national legal framework, has faced main oppositions after the 465 
enactment phase. The national bureaucracy has mingled the execution of MPAs with issues 466 
of bureaucratic politics and personal gain. During enforcement, opposition from target 467 
groups has become overt and hindered any actual change in fishing areas. 468 
In conclusion, the development of international institutions has influenced the 469 
national policy choices of Senegal, but not in a deterministic way. National actor 470 
constellations are free to move within the frame indicated by international institutions and 471 
determine the final result by facilitating or distorting national implementation. Dynamic 472 
constellations of political, bureaucratic, public and targeted actors have filtered and 473 
distorted the penetration of international rules in the Senegalese policy framework. They 474 
have done so by intervening in the formulation of a new law, in the definition of its 475 
implementation framework, and in the enforcement of the national policy (see figure 1). 476 
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They have changed and evolved throughout this process and finally altered initial 477 
objectives and watered down the functioning of MPAs as a tool for biodiversity protection 478 
and fish stock restoration. 479 
MPAs in Senegal will probably receive further scrutiny following the revision of 480 
the Code of Marine Fisheries, which is under preparation at the time of writing. These 481 
developments suggest benefits may be derived from a future comparative study on three 482 
groupings of MPAs: 483 
- the five MPAs established by Presidential Decree (the focus of this article); 484 
- the areas of the marine environment designated for some form of protection in the 485 
framework of nature reserves and national parks since the 1970s (see section 5.1); 486 
- and future MPAs established in the years to come under the new Code of Marine 487 
Fisheries. 488 
Such a comparative study may indeed reveal new insights into the interaction between 489 
international institutions and national actors at different moments in time. Similarly, a 490 
cross-country comparison of processes of establishment and implementation of marine 491 
protected areas in Senegal and other West African states may usefully highlight 492 
invariances that transcend national borders. This article may thus represent a first step in a 493 
research line aimed at untangling the complex interplay between international institutions 494 
and national actors, and understanding the complex issue of institutions-actors interaction. 495 
 496 
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